View source for TCN Protocol

{{short description|Proximity contact tracing protocol}}
{{Infobox protocol
| name      = Temporary Contact Numbers Protocol
| image     = 200505WVV.TCN Logo 1 WhiteBG.png
| caption   = 
| developer = TCN Coalition, incl. [[Covid Watch]]<ref name="Covid Watch">{{Cite web|url=https://www.covid-watch.org/|title=Covid Watch|date=2020-02-19|website=Covid Watch|language=en|access-date=2020-06-02|archive-date=2020-08-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806233559/https://covid-watch.org/}}</ref> and CoEpi<ref name="CoEpi website">{{Cite web|url=https://www.coepi.org/|title=CoEpi website|date=2020-03-17|website=CoEpi|language=en|access-date=2020-03-17}}</ref>
| introdate = {{Start date|2020|03|17}}<ref name="github.com">{{Cite web|url=https://github.com/covid19risk/covidwatch-ios/commit/b520d1486d9d898dadeb15dd94fbbb16c0e1d6a1|title=First implementation of anonymous exposure alert protocol |website=GitHub|language=en|access-date=2020-03-17}}</ref>
| industry  = [[Exposure Notification]]
| range     = ~{{convert|10|m|ft|abbr=on}}<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://blog.nordicsemi.com/getconnected/things-you-should-know-about-bluetooth-range|title=Things You Should Know About Bluetooth Range|last=Sponås|first=Jon Gunnar|website=blog.nordicsemi.com|language=en-gb|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref>
| newer     = <!--superseded by which protocol-->
}}
The '''Temporary Contact Numbers Protocol''', or '''TCN Protocol''', is an [[open source]], [[Decentralised system|decentralized]], anonymous [[Exposure Notification|exposure alert]] protocol developed by [[Covid Watch]]<ref name="Covid Watch">{{Cite web|url=https://www.covid-watch.org/|title=Covid Watch|date=2020-02-19|website=Covid Watch|language=en|access-date=2020-06-02|archive-date=2020-08-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806233559/https://covid-watch.org/}}</ref> in response to the [[COVID-19 pandemic]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://news.stanford.edu/2020/04/09/stanford-researchers-help-develop-privacy-focused-coronavirus-alert-app/|title=Stanford researchers help develop privacy-focused coronavirus alert app|last=University|first=Stanford|date=2020-04-09|website=Stanford News|language=en|access-date=2020-04-22}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/29/world/coronavirus-pandemic-privacy-rights//|title=One victim of COVID-19 pandemic may be privacy rights|date=2020-03-31|website=JapanTimes|language=en-US|access-date=2020-03-31|archive-date=2020-03-30|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200330161044/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/03/29/world/coronavirus-pandemic-privacy-rights/|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://venturebeat.com/2020/04/13/what-privacy-preserving-coronavirus-tracing-apps-need-to-succeed/|title=What privacy-preserving coronavirus tracing apps need to succeed|date=2020-04-13|website=VentureBeat|language=en-US|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://qz.com/1838625/how-bluetooth-could-power-a-global-experiment-in-contact-tracing/|title=How Bluetooth could bring digital contact tracing for Covid-19 to billions|last=Shendruk|first=Amrita Khalid, Amanda|website=Quartz|date=16 April 2020 |language=en|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref> The Covid Watch team, started as an independent research collaboration between [[Stanford University]] and the [[University of Waterloo]] was the first in the world to publish a [[white paper]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.covid-watch.org/article/|title=Covid Watch White Paper|date=2020-03-20|website=Covid Watch|language=en|access-date=2020-03-20|archive-date=2021-10-15|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211015150522/https://blog.covidwatch.org/en/covid-watch-whitepaper-using-crowdsourced-data-to-slow-virus-spread}}</ref> develop,<ref name="github.com">{{Cite web|url=https://github.com/covid19risk/covidwatch-ios/commit/b520d1486d9d898dadeb15dd94fbbb16c0e1d6a1|title=First implementation of anonymous exposure alert protocol |website=GitHub|language=en|access-date=2020-03-17}}</ref> and open source<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://github.com/covid19risk/|title=Covid Watch Github|date=2020-03-17|website=Github|language=en|access-date=2020-03-17}}</ref> fully anonymous Bluetooth exposure alert technology in collaboration with CoEpi<ref name="CoEpi website">{{Cite web|url=https://www.coepi.org/|title=CoEpi website|date=2020-03-17|website=CoEpi|language=en|access-date=2020-03-17}}</ref> after writing a blog post<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.covid-watch.org/blog/bluetooth/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200410042947/https://www.covid-watch.org/blog/bluetooth/|archive-date=2020-04-10|title=Covid Watch Bluetooth Primer Blog Post|date=2020-03-07|website=Internet Archive|language=en|access-date=2020-03-07}}</ref> on the topic in early March.

Covid Watch's TCN Protocol received significant news coverage<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.covid-watch.org/news/|title=Covid Watch News Coverage|date=2020-06-02|website=Covid Watch|language=en|access-date=2020-06-02|archive-date=2020-08-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200803044044/https://www.covid-watch.org/news}}</ref> and was followed by similar decentralized protocols in early April 2020 like [[Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing|DP-3T]], PACT,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-protocol-specification-ver-0.1.pdf/|title=First MIT PACT paper|date=2020-04-08|website=PACT MIT|language=en|access-date=2020-04-08|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200409130335/https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-protocol-specification-ver-0.1.pdf|archive-date=2020-04-09}}</ref> and Google/Apple [[Exposure Notification]] [[Software framework|framework]]. Covid Watch then helped other groups like the [[TCN Coalition]] and MIT SafePaths<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://news.mit.edu/2020/bluetooth-covid-19-contact-tracing-0409|title=Bluetooth signals from your smartphone could automate Covid-19 contact tracing while preserving privacy|date=2020-04-08|website=MIT News|language=en|access-date=2020-04-08}}</ref> implement the TCN Protocol within their open source projects to further the development of decentralized technology and foster global interoperability of contact tracing and exposure alerting apps, a key aspect of achieving widespread adoption.<ref name="initial-commit">{{Cite web|url=https://github.com/TCNCoalition/TCN/commit/1b68b920db1fb42709c7c8eb28c3d5e10c76fc3c|title=Initial TCN Coalition commit · TCNCoalition/TCN@1b68b92|website=GitHub|language=en|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref> Covid Watch volunteers and nonprofit staff also built a fully open source mobile app for sending anonymous exposure alerts first using the TCN Protocol<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://github.com/covid19risk/covidwatch-ios/|title=Covid Watch open source iOS TCN app|date=2020-03-17|website=Github|language=en|access-date=2020-03-17}}</ref> and later using the very similar Google/Apple Exposure Notification Framework (ENF).<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://github.com/covid19risk/|title=Covid Watch iOS G/A EN Github Repo|date=2020-06-02|website=Github|language=en|access-date=2020-06-02}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://github.com/covid19risk/|title=Covid Watch Github Repo|date=2020-03-07|website=Github|language=en|access-date=2020-03-07}}</ref>

The protocol, like [[BlueTrace]] and the [[Google / Apple contact tracing project]], use [[Bluetooth Low Energy]] to track and log encounters with other users.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://bluetrace.io/static/bluetrace_whitepaper-938063656596c104632def383eb33b3c.pdf|title=BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across borders|last=Jason Bay, Joel Kek, Alvin Tan, Chai Sheng Hau, Lai Yongquan, Janice Tan, Tang Anh Quy|website=Government Technology Agency|access-date=2020-04-12}}</ref><ref name=":3">{{Cite magazine|url=https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-strengths-weaknesses/|title=Is Apple and Google's Covid-19 Contact Tracing a Privacy Risk?|magazine=Wired|access-date=2020-04-18|language=en|issn=1059-1028}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://thecurrencyanalytics.com/13404/zcash-privacy-preserving-contact-tracing-app-on-blockchain-the-temporary-contact-number-tcn-coalition/|title=ZCash Privacy Preserving Contact Tracing App on Blockchain the Temporary Contact Number TCN Coalition|date=2020-04-12|website=Cryptocurrency News - TCAT|language=en-US|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref> The major distinction between TCN and protocols like BlueTrace is the fact the central reporting server never has access to contact logs nor is it responsible for processing and informing clients of contact.<ref name=":2">{{Citation|title=TCNCoalition/TCN|date=2020-04-18|url=https://github.com/TCNCoalition/TCN|publisher=TCN Coalition|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://pact.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/The-PACT-protocol-specification-ver-0.1.pdf|title=The PACT protocol specification|website=PACT MIT|access-date=2020-04-23}}</ref> Because contact logs are never transmitted to third parties, it has major privacy benefits over approaches like the one used in BlueTrace.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.theinternetofthings.eu/aisshwarya-tiwar-covid-19-zcash-zec-and-tcn-developing-privacy-preserving-contact-tracing-app|title=Aisshwarya Tiwar: COVID-19: Zcash (ZEC) and TCN Developing Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing App {{!}} IoT Council|website=www.theinternetofthings.eu|access-date=2020-04-19|archive-date=2020-05-14|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200514100118/https://www.theinternetofthings.eu/aisshwarya-tiwar-covid-19-zcash-zec-and-tcn-developing-privacy-preserving-contact-tracing-app}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Nabben|first=Kelsie|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340772290|title=Trustless Approaches to Digital Infrastructure in the Crisis of COVID-19|date=2020-04-14}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|title=Digital Ariadne: Citizen Empowerment for Epidemic Control|year=2020|author=Lorenz Cuno Klopfenstein |author2=Saverio Delpriori |author3=Gian Marco Di Francesco |author4=Riccardo Maldini |author5=Brendan Dominic Paolini |author6=Alessandro Bogliolo |arxiv=2004.07717|bibcode=2020arXiv200407717C}}</ref> This approach however, by its very nature, does not allow for human-in-the-loop reporting, potentially leading to false positives if the reports are not verified by public health agencies.<ref name=":0" />{{Rp|p. 6}}

The TCN protocol received notoriety as one of the first widely released digital contact tracing protocols<ref name="initial-commit"/><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://techxplore.com/news/2020-04-stanford-privacy-focused-coronavirus-app.html|title=Stanford researchers help develop privacy-focused coronavirus alert app|website=techxplore.com|language=en|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.news.gatech.edu/2020/04/14/will-smartphones-help-us-keep-covid-19-under-control|title=Will Smartphones Help Us Keep COVID-19 Under Control?|website=www.news.gatech.edu|access-date=2020-04-20}}</ref> alongside BlueTrace,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/covid19-trace-together-mobile-app-contact-tracing-coronavirus-12560616|title=Singapore launches TraceTogether mobile app to boost COVID-19 contact tracing efforts|website=CNA|language=en|access-date=2020-04-20|archive-date=2020-03-20|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200320111641/https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/covid19-trace-together-mobile-app-contact-tracing-coronavirus-12560616}}</ref> the Exposure Notification framework, and the [[Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing]] (PEPP-PT) project.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.insideprivacy.com/covid-19/covid-19-apps-and-websites-the-pan-european-privacy-preserving-proximity-tracing-initiative-and-guidance-by-supervisory-authorities/|title=COVID-19 Apps and Websites - The "Pan-European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing Initiative" and Guidance by Supervisory Authorities|date=2020-04-02|website=Inside Privacy|language=en-US|access-date=2020-04-20}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.zfnd.org/blog/private-contact-tracing-protocols-compared/|title=Private Contact Tracing Protocols Compared: DP-3T and CEN|last=Valence|first=Henry de|website=The Zcash Foundation|date=6 April 2020 |language=en|access-date=2020-04-22}}</ref> It also stood out for its incorporation of [[blockchain]] technology,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://thecurrencyanalytics.com/13404/zcash-privacy-preserving-contact-tracing-app-on-blockchain-the-temporary-contact-number-tcn-coalition/|title=ZCash Privacy Preserving Contact Tracing App on Blockchain the Temporary Contact Number TCN Coalition|date=2020-04-12|website=Cryptocurrency News - TCAT|language=en-US|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref> and its influence over the Google/Apple project.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Demonstrating 15 contact tracing and other tools built to mitigate the impact of COVID-19|url=https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/05/demonstrating-15-contact-tracing-and-other-tools-built-to-mitigate-the-impact-of-covid-19/|access-date=2020-10-31|website=TechCrunch|date=5 June 2020|language=en-US}}</ref><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4">{{Cite web|url=https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22834959|title=Apple and Google partner on Covid-19 contact tracing technology {{!}} Hacker News|website=news.ycombinator.com|access-date=2020-04-20}}</ref><ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2020/04/12/contact-tracing-in-the-real-world/|title=Contact Tracing in the Real World {{!}} Light Blue Touchpaper|date=12 April 2020 |language=en-US|access-date=2020-04-20}}</ref>

== Overview ==
The TCN protocol works off the basis of Temporary Contact Numbers (TCN), semi-random identifiers derived from a seed.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://lucumr.pocoo.org/2020/4/9/tcn-contact-tracing/|title=Temporary Contact Number based Contact Tracing|website=lucumr.pocoo.org|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref> When two clients encounter each other, a unique TCN is generated, exchanged, and then locally stored in a contact log.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://ncase.me/contact-tracing/|title=Protecting Lives & Liberty: How Contact Tracing Can Foil COVID-19 & Big Brother|website=ncase.me|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref> Then, once a user tests positive for infection, a report is sent to a central server. Each client on the network then collects the reports from the server and independently checks their local contact logs for a TCN contained in the report. If a matching TCN is found, then the user has come in close contact with an infected patient, and is warned by the client. Since each device locally verifies contact logs, and thus contact logs are never transmitted to third parties, the central reporting server cannot by itself ascertain the identity or contact log of any client in the network. This is in contrast to competing protocols like BlueTrace, where the central reporting server receives and processes client contact logs.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://medium.com/@frankvolkel/tracetogether-under-the-hood-7d5e509aeb5d|title=TraceTogether: under the hood|last=Liauw|first=🇸🇬 Frank|date=2020-04-09|website=Medium|language=en|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref>

== Temporary contact numbers ==
The entire protocol is based on the principle of ''temporary contact numbers'' (TCN), a unique and anonymous 128-bit identifier generated deterministically from a seed value on a client device. TCNs are used to identify people with which a user has come in contact, and the seed is used to compactly report infection to a central reporting server. TCN reports are authenticated to be genuine by a secret held only by the client.

=== Generation ===

To generate a TCN, first a ''report authorization key'' (RAK) and ''report verification key'' (RVK) are created as the signing and verification keys of a signature scheme (RAK-RVK pair). In the reference implementation this pair is created using the [[Ed25519]] signature scheme.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://github.com/TCNCoalition/TCN/blob/main/src/keys.rs|title=TCNCoalition/TCN/src/keys.rs|website=GitHub|language=en|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref>{{Rp|line. 13}} Then, using the RAK an initial ''temporary contact key'' (TCK) is generated using the algorithm <math>
tck_{0} = H\_tck(rak)
</math>, where <math>
H\_tck()
</math> is the [[SHA-2|SHA-256]] [[hash function]] as <math>
H\_tck(s) = SHA256(\text{b'H}\_\text{TCK'}||s)
</math>. This TCK is not used to generate any TCNs, but is used in the next TCK; where all future TCKs are calculated using the algorithm <math>
tck_{i} = H\_tck(rvk || tck_{i-1})
</math>. A 128 bit TCN is then generated from a given TCK using the algorithm <math>
tcn_{i>0} = H\_tcn(le\_u16(i) || tck_{i})
</math>, where  <math>
le\_u16()
</math> formats a supplied number as a [[little endian]] unsigned 2 byte integer,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://docs.rs/nom/2.2.1/nom/fn.le_u16.html|title=nom::le_u16 - Rust|website=docs.rs|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref> and <math>
H\_tcn()
</math> is the SHA-256 hash function as <math>
H\_tcn(s) = SHA256(\text{b'H}\_\text{TCN'}||s)[0:128]
</math>. The following diagram demonstrates the key derivation process:[[File:TCN_Protocol_Key_Generation.svg|center]]TCNs are unique to each device encounter, and RAK-RVK pairs are cycled at regular intervals to allow a client to report only specific periods of contact.

=== Reporting ===
When a client wishes to submit a report for the TCN indices <math>
s > 0
</math> to <math>
e
</math>, it structures the report as <math>
report = rvk || tck_{s - 1} || le\_u16(s) || le\_u16(e) || memo
</math>. A signature is then calculated using the RAK, and it is transmitted to the server as <math>
s\_report = report||sig
</math>.

Because any given TCK can only be used to derive an equal or higher indexed TCNs, by submitting <math>
tck_{s-1}
</math> no encounters prior to <math>
tcn_{s-1}
</math> can be calculated. However, there is no upper limit to encounters calculated using the same RAK-RVK pair, which is why they are cycled often. To prevent clients calculating unused TCNs, <math>
e
</math> indicates the last TCN index generated with the given RVK.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://github.com/TCNCoalition/tcn-client-android/blob/develop/tcn-client-android/src/main/java/org/tcncoalition/tcnclient/TcnKeys.kt|title=TCNCoalition/tcn-client-android/src/main/java/org/tcncoalition/tcnclient/TcnKeys.kt|website=GitHub|language=en|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref>{{Rp|lines. 49–61}} Additionally, since the RVK is used to calculate a TCK, and <math>
tck_{s-1}
</math> is provided, no valid TCNs in the reporting period can be derived from an illegitimate report. The only correct TCN calculable from a mismatched RVK and <math>
tck_{s-1}
</math> is <math>
tcn_{s-1}
</math>, the TCN before the start of the reporting period.

Once a report is received, clients individually recalculate TCKs and TCNs for a given period using the original algorithms:<math display="block">
\begin{array}{lcr}
tck_s = H\_tck(rvk || tck_{s-1})\\
tcn_{s} = H\_tcn(le\_u16(s) || tck_{s})\\
tck_{s+1} = H\_tck(rvk || tck_{s})\\
tcn_{s+1} = H\_tcn(le\_u16(s+1) || tck_{s+1})\\
...\\
tck_{e} = H\_tck(rvk || tck_{e-1})\\
tcn_{e} = H\_tcn(le\_u16(e) || tck_{e})
\end{array}
</math>This is used by client devices to check their local contact logs for potential encounters with the infected patient, but has the dual benefit of verifying reports since false reports will never produce matching TCNs.

=== Memo ===
In the report structure, the memo is a space for freeform messages that differ between TCN implementations. The section is between 2 and 257 bytes, and made up of a tag identifying the specific implementation, as well as a data and data length pair. It is formatted as  <math>
memo = tag || len(data) || data
</math>. The data is standardized for different tags, and can be as follows:
{| class="wikitable"
|+
!Tag
!Data standard
|-
|{{Code|code=0x0}}
|[[CoEpi]] symptom report v1
|-
|{{Code|code=0x1}}
|[[Covid Watch]] test result v1
|-
|{{Code|code=0x2}}
|[https://www.ito-app.org/ ito] report v1
|-
|{{Code|code=0x3-0xfe}}
|Allocated for future official TCN apps or versions
|-
|{{Code|code=0xff}}
|Reserved (can be used to add more than 256 types later)
|}

== Technical specification ==
The protocol can be divided into two responsibilities: an encounter between two devices running TCN apps, and the notification of potential infection to users that came in contact with a patient. For the purposes of this specification, these areas are named the ''encounter handshake'', and ''infection reporting''. The ''encounter handshake'' runs on Bluetooth LE and defines how two devices acknowledge each other's presence. The ''infection reporting'' is built on [[Hypertext Transfer Protocol|HTTPS]] and defines how infection notices are distributed among clients.

=== Encounter handshake ===
When two devices come within range of each other, they exchange a handshake containing TCNs. In order to achieve this the encounter handshake operates in two modes (both with two sub-modes), broadcast oriented and connection oriented. Broadcast oriented operates using the modes broadcaster and observer, while connection oriented operates using peripheral and central. The two modes are used to circumvent certain device limitations, particularly in regard to iOS restrictions in place before version 13.4.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.reddit.com/r/iOSBeta/comments/fcww2x/feature_ios_134_beta_enables_ble_long_range/|title=r/iOSBeta - [Feature] IOS 13.4 beta enables BLE long range support (iPhone 11/11 Pro only)|website=reddit|date=3 March 2020 |language=en-US|access-date=2020-04-18}}</ref> In both modes the protocol is identified with the 16 bit [[Universally unique identifier|UUID]] {{Code|code=0xC019}}.

In broadcast mode, a broadcaster advertises a 16-byte TCN using the service data field of the advertisement data. The observer reads the TCN from this field. In connection-oriented mode, the peripheral advertises using the UUID. The service exposes a read and writeable packet for sharing TCNs. After sharing a TCN, the central disconnects from the peripheral.

=== Infection reporting ===
When a user tests positive for infection, they upload a signed report, allowing the past 14 days of encounters to be calculated, to a central server. On a regular basis, client devices download reports from the server and check their local contact logs using the verification algorithm. If there is a matching record, the app notifies the user to potential infection.

== TCN Coalition ==
On 5 April 2020, the global [[TCN Coalition]] was founded by Covid Watch and other groups that had coalesced around what was essentially the same approach and largely overlapping protocols, with the goal to reduce fragmentation, and enable global interoperability of tracing and alerting apps, a key aspect of achieving widespread adoption.<ref name=":02">{{Cite web|url=https://tcn-coalition.org/|title=TCN Coalition · A Global Coalition for Privacy-First Digital Contact Tracing Protocols to Fight COVID-19|website=tcn-coalition.org|access-date=2020-04-16|archive-date=2021-07-04|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210704122756/https://www.lfph.io/tcn-coalition/|url-status=dead}}</ref> The TCN Coalition also helped establish the [[Data Rights for Digital Contact Tracing and Alerting]] framework, which functions as a bill of rights for users of such apps.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://dcta-datarights.com/|title=Data Rights for Digital Contact Tracing and Alerting · Overview|last=Reed <questions@dcta-datarights.org>|first=Harper|website=dcta-datarights.com|language=en|access-date=2020-04-16}}{{Dead link|date=March 2023 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

Currently the protocol is used by TCN Coalition members [[CoEpi]]<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.miragenews.com/will-smartphones-help-us-keep-covid-19-under-control/,%20https://www.miragenews.com/will-smartphones-help-us-keep-covid-19-under-control|title=Will Smartphones Help Us Keep COVID-19 Under Control? {{!}} Mirage News|date=2020-04-15|newspaper=Mirage News|language=en-AU|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|title=Co-Epi/app-android|date=2020-04-19|url=https://github.com/Co-Epi/app-android|publisher=CoEpi|access-date=2020-04-19}}</ref> and [[Covid Watch]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.covid-watch.org/|title=Covid Watch|website=www.covid-watch.org|access-date=2020-04-19|archive-date=2020-08-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200806233559/https://covid-watch.org/}}</ref><ref name=":2" /> and was likely a source of inspiration for the similar [[Google / Apple contact tracing project]].<ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=https://covid-watch.org/press_releases/google_apple_press_release|title=Covid Watch Celebrates Apple and Google's COVID-19 Contact Tracing Announcement|website=www.covid-watch.org|access-date=2020-04-18|archive-date=2020-04-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200419131233/https://covid-watch.org/press_releases/google_apple_press_release}}</ref><ref name=":4" />

== See also ==

* [[BlueTrace]]
* [[Google / Apple contact tracing project]]
*[[Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing]]

== References ==
{{reflist}}

== External links ==
* [https://covid-watch.org/ Covid Watch] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200417075057/https://covid-watch.org/ |date=2020-04-17 }}
* [https://tcn-coalition.org/ TCN Coalition] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210704122756/https://www.lfph.io/tcn-coalition/ |date=2021-07-04 }}
* [https://github.com/TCNCoalition/TCN Specification and reference implementation]
{{COVID-19 pandemic}}{{FOSS}}
[[Category:Application layer protocols]]
[[Category:Software associated with the COVID-19 pandemic]]
[[Category:Bluetooth software]]
[[Category:Medical software]]
[[Category:Android (operating system) software]]
[[Category:IOS software]]
[[Category:2020 software]]
[[Category:Software using the MIT license]]
[[Category:Digital contact tracing protocols]]
[[Category:Digital contact tracing protocols with decentralized reporting]]