Takeover Directive
Abdul Mannan
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- art 3, general principles including the equal treatment principle for shareholders
- art 4, the requirement on member states for an authority to monitor takeovers (e.g. in the UK, this is the Takeover Panel)
- art 5, the requirement to make a mandatory bid for everyone's shares, and giving an equitable price
- art 6, minimum requirements for information on a bid being made
- art 7, member states can set between 2 and 10 weeks as a limit for the period for acceptance of a bid
- art 8, bids should be made public without material errors or misrepresentations
- art 9, board neutrality rule, no frustrating action may be taken without specific post-bid shareholder approval. Directors may, however, still seek out another more favourable bidder (or ‘white knight’) or complete measures begun pre-bid that fall into a company's ordinary course of business.
- art 9(2) board can search for a more favourable suitor
- art 9(5) board should give its views on a bid
- art 11, non compulsory opt in rules[1] Gives breakthrough provisions to defeat, (a) share structures making minority shareholders have disproportionate voting rights (b) limitations on share ownership (c) restrictions on share transfers in the company's articles or a share holder agreement.
- art 12, bnr is optional in art 9(2), and neither is art 11.
- art 20, directive provisions will be reviewed in 2011.
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See also
Notes
- ^ Implemented by Companies Act 2006, ss 966-972 in UK company law
References
- PL Davies, E-P Schuster and E Van de Walle de Ghelcke, 'The Takeover Directive as a Protectionist Tool?' (2010) EGCI Working Paper
- D Kershaw, ‘The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibition’ (2007) 56 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 267